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AIRBORNE ASSASSIN: WHY THE OFFICIAL STOCKPILES 
OF THE SMALLPOX VIRUS MUST BE DESTROYED 
ABSTRACT 
Smallpox, one of the deadliest viruses, preyed upon the human population 
for thousands of years, leaving a trail of death and destruction in its wake. In 
1980, after a successful global immunization campaign, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) declared that smallpox was officially eradicated. As a 
precautionary measure, WHO formally requested that all countries destroy 
their stockpiles of the virus or send their stockpiles to one of two government 
laboratories. As a result of this request, smallpox, a virus that kills a third of 
those infected, officially exists within the confines of two Collaborating 
Centres: the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, 
Georgia and the Vector Institute (Vector) in Novosibirsk, Siberia. Since then, 
the issue of whether to destroy the official stockpiles of the smallpox virus has 
been vigorously debated. Recent incidents, such as protocol lapses at the CDC 
that exposed employees to anthrax and the discovery of a forgotten stockpile of 
smallpox at the National Institutes for Health (NIH), have further pushed the 
issue. In an increasingly interconnected global community, the prospect of an 
outbreak of a highly contagious, eradicated disease is more than 
disconcerting. Smallpox can and has escaped the confines of a laboratory 
before. In a world plagued by conflict and violence, the potential for 
bioterrorism cannot be overlooked, especially when considering smallpox has 
been weaponized as an agent of biological warfare before. This Comment 
advocates for the destruction of the official stockpiles of the smallpox virus 
through the introduction of a bilateral treaty between the United States and 
Russia. Additionally, this Comment proposes a United Nations Security 
Council resolution that includes a four-point legal framework that will 
effectively address current and future threats of bioterrorism. Lastly, in 
accordance with many international scholars, this Comment endorses the 
express criminalization of bioterrorism under international law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Janet Parker accepted a job as a medical photographer at England’s 
University of Birmingham Medical School, she likely did not anticipate that 
her name and her story would make history.1 However, in 1978, Parker did 
make history when she became the last known person to die from smallpox.2 
At the university, Parker spent much of her time tucked away in a darkroom, 
developing photographs.3 Unfortunately for Parker, a laboratory studying one 
of the world’s most devastating diseases was just beneath her feet.4 
Professor Henry Bedson managed the laboratory situated directly 
underneath Parker’s darkroom.5 Bedson, a medical researcher, was convinced 
that he was on the verge of a breakthrough with the smallpox virus.6 The 
World Health Organization (WHO) believed him; however, it condemned the 
inadequate conditions of his laboratory.7 Although WHO wanted Bedson to 
continue his research, it could not continue funding an unsafe facility and other 
organizations balked at the prospect of funding a laboratory to study what was 
then an all-but-eradicated virus.8 Thus, Bedson found himself at a crossroads. 
He remained committed to his cause and decided to hasten his smallpox 
research until the funding ran dry.9 
This accelerated pace led to recklessness, further deteriorating the already 
inadequate conditions in Bedson’s laboratory.10 The procedural safeguards that 
would have prevented smallpox, an airborne virus, from escaping the 
laboratory were shirked.11 On account of the negligent conditions in Bedson’s 
laboratory, the inevitable happened: the smallpox virus entered the air.12 While 
 
 1 Colette Flight, Smallpox: Eradicating the Scourge, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_ 
seapower/smallpox_01.shtml (last updated Feb. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Flight, Eradicating the Scourge]. 
 2 Adam Wears, The Tragic Death of Janet Parker, Smallpox’s Last Victim, KNOWLEDGENUTS (Sept. 8, 
2013), http://knowledgenuts.com/2013/09/08/the-tragic-death-of-janet-parker-smallpoxs-last-victim/. 
 3 Birmingham Mail, When Birmingham Was Gripped by Deadly Smallpox Virus, BIRMINGHAM MAIL 
(June 2, 2011, 10:58 AM), http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/local-news/birmingham-mail-feature-
when-birmingham-was-gripped-155391. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Esther Inglis-Arkell, The Horrifying Story of the Last Death by Smallpox, IO9 (Aug. 18, 2013, 12:00 
PM), http://io9.gizmodo.com/the-horrifying-story-of-the-last-death-by-smallpox-1161664590. 
 8 See id. 
 9 See Birmingham Mail, supra note 3. 
 10 See Inglis-Arkell, supra note 7. 
 11 See id. 
 12 See Birmingham Mail, supra note 3. 
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Bedson’s researchers kept up to date on their smallpox vaccinations, Janet 
Parker had not been vaccinated in twelve years.13 As she developed 
photographs, particles of this airborne assassin traveled through the building’s 
air ducts and into her darkroom, where she unknowingly breathed the deadly 
pathogen into her lungs.14 
On August 11, 1978, Janet Parker fell ill with a headache and muscular 
pain.15 At first, she attributed her symptoms to a cold, but the smallpox virus 
continued to rage inside of her.16 She developed a rash, which doctors insisted 
was benign.17 Shortly thereafter, her symptoms worsened and troubling spots 
emerged on her face and body.18 Parker was admitted to the local hospital for 
treatment.19 Although a spotted rash is often the calling card of the smallpox 
virus,20 it took six days for Parker to be diagnosed.21 Doctors likely did not 
immediately attribute Parker’s symptoms to smallpox because it was a nearly 
eradicated virus that she had previously been vaccinated for.22 Three weeks 
later, Janet Parker succumbed to the virus, cementing her tragic place in 
history as the last known victim of smallpox.23 
In 1980, following the success of a global immunization campaign, WHO 
declared that smallpox was officially eradicated.24 Prior to its eradication, 
scientists around the world studied the virus in the hopes of perfecting a 
vaccine.25 As a precautionary measure, WHO formally requested that all 
countries destroy their stockpiles of the virus or send their stockpiles to one of 
two government laboratories.26 As a result of this request, smallpox, a virus 
 
 13 Inglis-Arkell, supra note 7. 
 14 See Birmingham Mail, supra note 3. 
 15 SEC’Y OF STATE FOR SOC. SERV., REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE CAUSE OF THE 1978 
BIRMINGHAM SMALLPOX OCCURRENCE, 1980, HC, ¶ 2 (UK). 
 16 See Birmingham Mail, supra note 3. 
 17 SEC’Y OF STATE FOR SOC. SERV., supra note 15. 
 18 See id. 
 19 See id. 
 20 See Smallpox Fact Sheet, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (last updated Jan. 15, 2016), 
http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/overview/disease-facts.asp. 
 21 Birmingham Mail, supra note 3. Upon learning that Parker contracted smallpox as a result of his 
laboratory’s unsafe procedures, Bedson became overcome with guilt and committed suicide. Id.  
 22 See id. 
 23 See Inglis-Arkell, supra note 7. 
 24 Emergencies Preparedness, Response: Smallpox, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/ 
csr/disease/smallpox/en/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2016). 
 25 Even the famed scientist, Edward Jenner, experimented with the smallpox virus. See Stefan Riedel, 
Edward Jenner and the History of Smallpox and Vaccination, 18 PROCEEDINGS: BAYLOR UNIV. MED. CTR. 21, 
21 (2005). His work greatly contributed to the eventual vaccine. Id. 
 26 RICHARD PRESTON, DEMON IN THE FREEZER: A TRUE STORY 96 (2003).  
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that kills a third of those infected,27 officially exists within the confines of two 
WHO Collaborating Centres: the Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia and the Vector Institute (Vector) in Novosibirsk, 
Siberia.28 
The issue of whether or not to destroy the official stockpiles of the 
smallpox virus became a subject of vigorous debate.29 Despite much of the 
scientific community arguing in favor of destruction,30 the virus remains within 
the CDC and Vector.31 However, recent incidents, such as protocol lapses at 
the CDC that exposed employees to anthrax32 and the discovery of a forgotten 
stockpile of smallpox at the National Institutes for Health (NIH),33 have 
breathed new life into the debate. In a world rife with conflict and violence, the 
prospect of bioterrorism, which “involves the malicious use of pathogenic 
microbes to cause disease, death, and fear in civil populations,”34 cannot be 
ignored. As Janet Parker’s death illustrates, smallpox can and has escaped the 
confines of a laboratory.35 Even more startling, the virus has previously been 
weaponized as an agent of biological warfare.36 What would happen if 
smallpox, the virus that brutally ravaged the human population, fell into the 
wrong hands? 
This Comment advocates for the destruction of the official stockpiles of the 
smallpox virus through the introduction of a bilateral treaty between the United 
States and Russia. Additionally, this Comment proposes a United Nations 
(U.N.) Security Council resolution that includes a four-point legal framework 
 
 27 Flight, Eradicating the Scourge, supra note 1. 
 28 Id. WHO Collaborating Centres are institutions such as research institutions directed by the Director-
General to carry out activities in support of WHO’s programs. Collaborating Centres, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/collaboratingcentres/en/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2016). 
 29 See D.A. Henderson, Deliberations Regarding the Destruction of Smallpox Virus: A Historical 
Review, 1980-1998 (Nov. 20, 1998) (unpublished working paper) (available at http://www.cojoweb.com/ 
Biodefense7.html) [hereinafter Henderson, Deliberations Regarding the Destruction of Smallpox Virus]. 
 30 See id. 
 31 Flight, Eradicating the Scourge, supra note 1. 




 33 Brady Dennis & Lena H. Sun, FDA Found More Than Smallpox Vials in Storage Room, WASH. POST 
(July 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/fda-found-more-than-smallpox-
vials-in-storage-room/2014/07/16/850d4b12-0d22-11e4-8341-b8072b1e7348_story.html. 
 34 David P. Fidler, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and International Law, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 7, 11 (2002). 
 35 See Birmingham Mail, supra note 3. 
 36 PRESTON, supra note 26, at 112. 
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to effectively address current and future threats of bioterrorism. Lastly, in 
accordance with many international scholars, this Comment endorses the 
express criminalization of bioterrorism under international law. Part II of this 
Comment discusses the eradication of smallpox, its official and unofficial 
existence today, and the debate surrounding whether the official stocks should 
be destroyed. Part III critiques the current legal frameworks in place that are 
meant to address bioterrorism. To successfully destroy the smallpox virus and 
protect against future threats, Part IV proposes the aforementioned bilateral 
treaty, U.N. Security Council resolution, and express criminalization that will 
effect the necessary change. Part V serves as a brief summary and conclusion. 
I. NOW AND THEN: SMALLPOX THROUGH THE YEARS 
A. The Eradication of Smallpox 
The smallpox virus has been affecting and infecting the human race for 
thousands of years.37 Caused by the variola virus,38 smallpox is virulent,39 
contagious,40 and easily “transmitted from person to person via infected 
aerosols and droplets from infected symptomatic people.”41 The famed 
scientist and father of immunology, Edward Jenner, referred to smallpox as 
“the speckled monster,” referring to its most well-known symptom: a spotted 
rash that spreads across the infected individual’s skin.42 A person infected with 
smallpox remains contagious until each and every spot on their body has 
scabbed and fallen off.43 In spite of its longstanding existence, smallpox 
experienced a particularly deadly resurgence in the nineteenth and twentieth 
 
 37 See Aneela Naureen Hussain, Smallpox, MEDSCAPE, http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/237229-
overview (last updated Nov. 17, 2015). One of the earliest suspected cases of smallpox dates back to 1157 
BCE, and was discovered in the remains of the Egyptian pharaoh, Ramses V. Id. When researchers studied his 
mummified remains, they noted the trademark scarring that is common with smallpox. History of Smallpox, 
HIST. OF VACCINES, http://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/timelines/smallpox (last visited Oct. 5, 2016). 
The existence of a smallpox-like disease is also present in Sanskrit medical texts, which date back to 1500 
BCE. Id.  
 38 Smallpox Fact Sheet, supra note 20. For more information on the variola virus, see Hussain, supra 
note 37. 
 39 Flight, Eradicating the Scourge, supra note 1. 
 40 Frequently Asked Questions and Answers on Smallpox, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/ 
csr/disease/smallpox/faq/en/ (last updated June 28, 2016). 
 41 Emergencies Preparedness, Response: Smallpox, supra note 24. Humans are the only known natural 
hosts of the variola virus. Smallpox Fact Sheet, supra note 20.  
 42 Flight, Eradicating the Scourge, supra note 1. 
 43 See Smallpox Fact Sheet, supra note 20.  
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centuries.44 The death toll from these epidemics was staggering with “[s]ome 
estimates indicat[ing] that 20th-century worldwide deaths from smallpox 
numbered more than 300 million.”45 Although smallpox did not discriminate in 
terms of the countries it infected,46 developing countries were hit the hardest, 
experiencing “as many as fifty million smallpox cases per year.”47 In 1959, 
“60% of the world’s population lived in areas where smallpox was endemic.”48 
In response to smallpox’s ongoing devastation and increased pressure from 
the international community, WHO launched the Smallpox Eradication 
Programme (SEP).49 The SEP’s strategy was twofold: “to vaccinate at least 
80% of the population and to establish systems for surveillance (case 
detection) and containment of outbreaks.”50 The SEP ran from 1966 until 1980, 
when WHO officially declared that smallpox had successfully been 
eradicated.51 Most notably, smallpox became “the first disease to have been 
eradicated through concerted and determined global action.”52 D.A. 
Henderson, one of the scientists who directed the SEP, attributes its success 
largely to “a unique, fully collaborative international effort on the part of WHO 
and Member States.”53 Because WHO had no binding legal authority to force 
countries to participate, the SEP was designed “to evolve within a framework 
of broad principles and expectations, pragmatically modified by reality.”54 
B. Official (and Unofficial) Housing of the Smallpox Virus 
As mentioned above, in the midst of the SEP, WHO formally requested 
that all countries either destroy their stockpiles of the smallpox virus or send 
 
 44 History of Smallpox, supra note 37.  
 45 Id.  
 46 David A. Koplow, That Wonderful Year: Smallpox, Genetic Engineering, and Bio-Terrorism, 62 MD. 
L. REV. 417, 431 (2003). In the nineteenth century, “three major epidemics rocked even the most developed 
European countries.” Id. 
 47 Id. at 432 (referring to the 1950s). 
 48 D.A. Henderson, Principles and Lessons from the Smallpox Eradication Programme, 65 BULL. 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 535, 536 (1987) [hereinafter Henderson, Principles and Lessons from the Smallpox 
Eradication Programme]. 
 49 F. FENNER ET AL., WORLD HEALTH ORG., Smallpox and its Eradication, 6 HIST. OF INT’L PUB. HEALTH 
1, 422 (1988). 
 50 Henderson, Principles and Lessons from the Smallpox Eradication Programme, supra note 48. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 535. 
 53 Id. 
 54 FENNER ET AL., supra note 49.  
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them to one of two Collaborating Centres.55 Although WHO did not have the 
legal authority to compel countries to relinquish their stockpiles, all 
laboratories were eventually deemed compliant.56 As of today, smallpox may 
only officially exist within the two Collaborating Centres: the CDC57 and 
Vector.58 Unfortunately, these facilities are not infallible. From exposing 
employees to live anthrax59 to improperly sending deadly pathogens,60 the 
lapses at the CDC have become readily apparent in recent years. Vector is also 
problematic because it was once used as a Soviet biological weapons 
laboratory that in fact weaponized smallpox.61 In 1989, scientists at Vector 
“were making and tending a stockpile of twenty tons of weapons-grade 
smallpox.”62 They intended to put smallpox into bio-warheads, which would 
parachute down to earth and spray smallpox particles into the air.63 Between 
egregious lapses in protocol at the CDC and Vector’s nefarious history, it is 
reasonable to question whether the official smallpox stockpiles are truly 
secure. 
The security of the official stockpiles is a cause for concern; however, the 
very real likelihood that unofficial stockpiles exist is equally as alarming.64 
After WHO called for all countries to dispose of their smallpox stockpiles, “no 
inspections were carried out to verify that other countries had destroyed their 
 
 55 Henderson, Principles and Lessons from the Smallpox Eradication Programme, supra note 48, at 535. 
In 1975, it was known that “at least seventy-five laboratories had frozen stocks of smallpox virus.” PRESTON, 
supra note 26. 
 56 See PRESTON, supra note 26. See also Koplow, supra note 46, at 438. 
 57 It is rumored that the CDC keeps its stockpile in a stainless steel freezer. PRESTON, supra note 26. The 
freezer is secured to the ground and contains an alarm system that will alert federal marshals. See id. 
 58 Id. The Russian stockpile was moved to Vector after its previous home was deemed unsafe. See 
Koplow, supra note 46, at 439. 
 59 Sun, supra note 32. 
 60 Dennis & Sun, supra note 33. The CDC “improperly sent potentially deadly pathogens, including 
anthrax, botulism bacteria and a virulent bird flu virus to other laboratories in five separate incidents over the 
past decade . . . .” Brady Dennis & Lena H. Sun, CDC Says It Improperly Sent Dangerous Pathogens in Five 
Incidents in Past Decade, WASH. POST (July 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/cdc-says-it-improperly-sent-dangerous-pathogens-in-five-incidents-in-past-decade/2014/07/11/acd55 
bfc-0882-11e4-a0dd-f2b22a257353_story.html. 
 61 Judith Miller, Russian Scientist Dies in Ebola Accident at Former Weapons Lab, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/25/world/russian-scientist-dies-in-ebola-accident-at-former-weapons-
lab.html. 
 62 PRESTON, supra note 26. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Colette Flight, Silent Weapon: Smallpox and Biological Warfare, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
history/worldwars/coldwar/pox_weapon_01.shtml (last updated Feb. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Flight, Silent 
Weapon]. 
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stocks of the virus.”65 In fact, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and 
Yugoslavia are suspected of having retained smallpox vials.66 Even Frank 
Fenner, one of the leaders of the SEP, believes that Russia possesses more 
smallpox than what it officially holds at Vector.67 Dr. Ken Alibek, a former 
Vector scientist, thinks it is possible that, after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
disgruntled Vector scientists may have sold samples of smallpox or left “to 
work in rogue states engaged in illicit biological weapons development.”68 
This theory resonates with Western intelligence agencies, which contend that 
North Korea, Iraq, and Russia “have the capacity to deploy smallpox as a 
weapon of mass destruction.”69 Following the 2014 discovery of a forgotten 
smallpox stockpile in a storage room at the NIH,70 it is impossible not to 
wonder where else the virus might be hiding. 
C. To Destroy or Not to Destroy—That is the Question 
Once the SEP successfully eradicated smallpox, many in the scientific 
community questioned whether the official stockpiles should be retained at 
all.71 WHO’s Committee on Orthopoxvirus Infections was given the 
momentous task of deciding whether to retain or destroy the official stocks.72 
Before deciding, the Committee met widely with the scientific community to 
elicit their views on the subject.73 Scientists who advocated for retention saw 
scientific value in the stockpiles and did not want to lose the genetic 
information held within the virus.74 With the potential for unofficial stockpiles 
and rogue science, they argued that the official stocks should be retained to 
create a better vaccine.75 Scientists who advocated for destruction “feared the 
 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 David Brown, Destruction of Smallpox Samples Is Reassessed, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 1999), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/03/15/destruction-of-smallpox-samples-is-reassessed/c1 
b1dbbd-14a1-488e-b43f-672bcdbc2f0e/ (“I think the likelihood that the Russians destroyed everything except 
what they had in the WHO laboratory is very small”). 
 68 Flight, Silent Weapon, supra note 64. 
 69 Id. After a former Iraqi bioweapons researcher professed that some of his colleagues had experimented 
with camelpox, “[s]ome people have inferred that Iraq had smallpox, and was using camelpox as a safe 
‘surrogate’ in tests” because camelpox is genetically similar to smallpox but does not infect humans. Brown, 
supra note 67.  
 70 Dennis & Sun, supra note 33. 
 71 See Henderson, Deliberations Regarding the Destruction of Smallpox Virus, supra note 29. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See id. 
 74 See id. 
 75 Brown, supra note 67. 
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reintroduction of smallpox”76 into a vulnerable population. Although they 
acknowledged that unofficial stockpiles could exist, they believed that an 
international agreement “would diminish to some extent the likelihood of the 
virus being released.”77 
With arguments made on both sides, it became increasingly clear that the 
majority of the scientific community advocated for the destruction of the 
official smallpox stockpiles.78 Thus, in 1994, the Committee voted 
unanimously in favor of destruction and set specific deadlines to carry out its 
decision.79 However, every deadline was either delayed or ignored altogether.80 
As each deadline passed, so did the expectation that the virus would actually 
be destroyed. 
II. BIOTERRORISM: CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Outbreak: If Smallpox Were Used as an Agent of Bioterror Today 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the anthrax attacks 
that followed, the fear that smallpox could be used as a biological weapon was 
pervasive amongst nations.81 Although many years have passed since then, this 
fear should persist. Evidence indicates that al-Qaeda actively pursued and 
amassed biological weapons well before the September 11th attacks and has 
continued to prioritize the development of biological weapons.82 Prior to the 
September 11th attacks, scientists “conduct[ed] basic training courses in 
chemical, biological, and radiological weapons for hundreds of extremists” at 
al-Qaeda training camps.83 Al-Qaeda leadership recruited a “Pakistani 
government biologist . . . to develop a biological weapons program” in addition 
 
 76 Henderson, Deliberations Regarding the Destruction of Smallpox Virus, supra note 29. 
 77 Id. 
 78 See id. In 1993, the Counsel of the American Society of Microbiology, the Executive Board of the 
International Union of Microbiological Societies, the Board of Scientific Counselors of the National Center for 
Infectious Diseases of the CDC, the Board of Directors of the American Type Culture Collection, and the 
Russian Academy of Medical Sciences all advocated for destruction. See id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Koplow, supra note 46, at 443. 
 81 Sheryl G. Stolberg & Judith Miller, A Nation Challenged: Bioterror Role an Uneasy Fit for the 
C.D.C., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/11/us/a-nation-challenged-medicine-
bioterror-role-an-uneasy-fit-for-the-cdc.html. There was speculation that one of the planes hijacked on 9/11 
may have been heading for the CDC. Id. 
 82 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Al Qaeda’s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 25, 
2010), http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/01/25/al-qaedas-pursuit-of-weapons-of-mass-destruction/. 
 83 Id. 
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to another program that focused solely on the development of weaponized 
anthrax.84 Shortly before September 11th, two members of al-Qaeda were 
detained in the United States with a crop duster manual and a biology textbook 
in their possession.85 This discovery suggested that a biological attack was 
imminent86 and the gravity of that potential attack was heightened by the use of 
a crop duster, as it has the ability to quickly spray a multitude of deadly 
pathogens into the airspace.87 Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, 
al-Qaeda operatives continued to receive biological and chemical weapons 
training.88 Al-Qaeda’s biological and nuclear weapons programs are mentioned 
in many of the group’s documents and, the September 11th mastermind 
himself, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, confirmed some of the programs’ 
details.89 Al-Qaeda’s longstanding, steady pursuit and development of 
biological weapons is deeply unsettling and a credible threat to both national 
and global security. 
While al-Qaeda and its bioterrorism programs remain troubling, it is 
important not to discount the new kid on the block: the rapidly emerging global 
threat known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Having already 
carried out a large-scale massacre in Paris90 as well as downing a Russian 
airliner with a soda can bomb,91 it is clear that ISIS is a force to be reckoned 
with. With mass atrocities as its goal, ISIS next move could very well be 
bioterrorism; and documents recovered from an ISIS laptop seem to confirm 
this conjecture. The laptop’s owner, who studied chemistry and physics, sought 
to use his education to develop biological weapons for ISIS.92 This conjecture 
 
 84 Id. Al-Qaeda attempted an anthrax attack on the United States; however, it was ultimately 
unsuccessful. See id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See id. 
 87 See Lynn C. Klotz & Edward J. Sylvester, Crying Wolf: The Terrorist Crop-Duster, HUFFINGTON 
POST: THE BLOG (June 14, 2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-lynn-c-klotz/crying-wolf-the-
terrorist_b_538204.html. 
 88 Mowatt-Larssen, supra note 82.  
 89 Id. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed later recanted some of his prior statements regarding al-Qaeda’s nuclear 
and biological weapons programs. Id. 
 90 See generally Rukmini Callimachi, ISIS Claims Responsibility, Calling Paris Attacks ‘First of the 
Storm,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/isis-claims-responsibility-
for-paris-attacks-calling-them-miracles.html.  
 91 See generally Barbara Starr & Catherine E. Shoichet, Russian Plane Crash: U.S. Intel Suggests ISIS 
Bomb Brought Down Jet, CNN (Nov. 4, 2015, 8:37 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/04/africa/russian-
plane-crash-egypt-sinai/; C.J. Chivers, Bomb Experts Analyze the ISIS Soda-Can Bomb Photo, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 18, 2015, 6:01 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/live/paris-attacks-live-updates/a/. 
 92 Harald Doornbos & Jenan Moussa, Found: The Islamic State’s Terror Laptop of Doom, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Aug. 28, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/28/found-the-islamic-states-terror-laptop-of-doom/. 
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is supported by the laptop’s contents, which included documentation “on how 
to develop biological weapons and how to weaponize the bubonic plague from 
infected animals.”93 The laptop also contained research on how to safely test a 
weaponized disease.94 The laptop’s owner understood the devastation 
biological weapons can cause, remarking that “[t]he advantage of biological 
weapons is that they do not cost a lot of money, while the human casualties can 
be huge.”95 Although it is unknown whether ISIS currently possesses any 
biological weapons, some contend that this extremist group has the capabilities 
and wherewithal to produce them.96 
If a smallpox outbreak were to occur today,97 the potential damage would 
be incalculable. Firstly, in our increasingly interconnected world, the potential 
for transmission of this airborne assassin is amplified with each plane, train, 
and airspace shared.98 Secondly, there is no diagnostic test for smallpox and 
many doctors are unfamiliar with the symptoms of an eradicated disease.99 
This means “that the diagnosis of initial smallpox cases will be delayed, further 
promoting spread of [the] disease.”100 Thirdly, because routine smallpox 
vaccinations stopped in the 1970s,101 “the global susceptibility to [the] 
smallpox virus is higher than it has ever been in modern history.”102 The 
smallpox vaccine is currently unavailable to the public,103 and even so, it has 
many adverse side effects, including death.104 Lastly, and most significantly, 
the current frameworks in place to address a smallpox outbreak or biological 
 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See id. 
 97 If smallpox were to reappear, “[i]t would have to be from deliberate use.” Brown, supra note 67. 
 98 One study analyzed the rate of transmission of smallpox in contemporary industrialized societies and 
determined that one infected person could infect four to six others. Tara O’Toole et al., Shining Light on 
“Dark Winter,” 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 972, 975 (2002). 
 99 See Lawrence K. Altman, Smallpox Vaccine Knowledge Found Lacking, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/10/us/smallpox-vaccine-knowledge-found-lacking.html. 
 100 O’Toole et al., supra note 98, at 974. 
 101 FENNER ET AL., supra note 49, at 424. WHO called for the cessation of routine smallpox vaccination 
programs in all countries. See id. 
 102 O’Toole et al., supra note 98, at 974. See Edward P. Richards et. al., The Smallpox Vaccination 
Campaign of 2003: Why Did It Fail and What Are the Lessons for BioTerrorism Preparedness?, 64 LA. L. 
REV. 851, 857 (2004) (“Smallpox vaccination does not give life-long immunity, and approximately half of the 
world’s population has never been vaccinated.”). 
 103 Frequently Asked Questions About Smallpox Vaccine, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(Dec. 29, 2004), http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/faq.asp. 
 104 Edward A. Belongia & Allison L. Naleway, Smallpox Vaccine: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 1 
CLINICAL MED. & RES. 87, 89 (2003). 
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attack fall woefully short. These frameworks will be explored more fully 
below. 
B. Current Bioterrorism Preparedness Programs 
The world’s most respected global health organizations address the 
possibility of a bioterrorism attack by having plans in place to combat a 
smallpox outbreak in the twenty-first century.105 Both the CDC and WHO have 
outlined preparedness programs to respond, contain, and treat an outbreak.106 
These plans emphasize quick identification and diagnosis of the virus so as to 
isolate those infected and prevent smallpox from spreading further into the 
population.107 Once a case of smallpox has been confirmed, both plans call for 
vaccination.108 WHO even maintains an emergency stockpile of the smallpox 
vaccine.109 
While it is commendable for the CDC and WHO to take proactive steps to 
tackle a potential resurgence of the virus, the likely ineffectiveness of these 
preparedness programs in the face of an actual outbreak offers little comfort.110 
There has never been a widespread, full-scale biological attack using airborne 
pathogens;111 thus, these procedures have never actually been implemented and 
are largely untested.112 The United States has dealt with biological terrorism 
using an airborne pathogen on only one occasion: the 2001 anthrax attacks.113 
 
 105 See, e.g., CDC Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(Mar. 20, 2003), http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/response-plan/files/exec-sections-i-vi.pdf. 
 106 See id.; see also Preparedness in the Event of a Smallpox Outbreak, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/smallpox/preparedness/en/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2016). 
 107 See Preparedness in the Event of a Smallpox Outbreak, supra note 106; see also CDC Smallpox 
Response Plan and Guidelines, supra note 105. 
 108 See CDC Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines, supra note 105; see also Preparedness in the Event 
of a Smallpox Outbreak, supra note 106. 
 109 Preparedness in the Event of a Smallpox Outbreak, supra note 106. 
 110 Kelly S. Culpepper, Bioterrorism and the Legal Ramifications of Preventative and Containment 
Measures, 12 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 245, 276 (2008). 
 111 When biological agents are utilized in a way that results in widespread, mass casualties, the pathogens 
are often referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMDS). See Oliver Grundmann, The Current State of 
Bioterrorist Attack Surveillance and Preparedness in the US, 7 RISK MANAGEMENT & HEALTHCARE POL’Y 
177, 178 (2014) (“Despite the possibility of causing mass casualties, to date there have been no reported 
incidents where biological agents have been causatively linked to be used as WMDs [weapons of mass 
destruction].”). 
 112 Culpepper, supra note 110. 
 113 See Anthrax: The Threat, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
anthrax/bioterrorism/threat.html (last updated Aug. 1, 2014). It is important to note that there are other 
instances of bioterrorism in U.S. history. See Scott Keyes, A Strange but True Tale of Voter Fraud and 
Bioterrorism, ATLANTIC (June 10, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/06/a-strange-but-
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Like smallpox, anthrax can be transmitted through the air and inhaled.114 
Although considered “the worst biological attacks in U.S. history,” with five 
deaths and only seventeen individuals exposed,115 the 2001 anthrax attacks 
failed to develop into a widespread, biological attack that would cause mass 
destruction. With little experience combatting bioterrorism, “the effectiveness 
of these procedures will not be tested until an actual outbreak occurs.”116 
Although untested, it is clear that, in the event of a widespread outbreak, 
these preparedness programs would still fall devastatingly short. While both 
the CDC and WHO emphasize the importance of a timely identification of the 
virus, this is easier said than done. Having been eradicated for decades, many 
doctors are unfamiliar with the virus117 and may not correctly diagnose an 
infected patient. With no diagnostic testing widely available118 and the general 
lack of smallpox knowledge in the medical community,119 there is a high 
likelihood that an infected patient could be misdiagnosed, which would enable 
the virus to spread amongst the unimmunized, at-risk population. Despite 
vaccination being a key point in both preparedness plans, when facing a 
smallpox epidemic, receiving the vaccine is more of a pipe dream than a 
reality. With an ever-growing population, WHO’s emergency stockpile of the 
smallpox vaccine is not enough to combat a full-blown epidemic.120 There 
simply will not be enough to vaccinate everyone in need. 
 
true-tale-of-voter-fraud-and-bioterrorism/372445/. For example, the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, which 
involved the salmonella poisoning of 751 individuals, is the largest bioterror attack on record. Id. The sheer 
number of infected individuals suggests that the attack was indeed widespread; however, this bioterror attack 
did not involve an airborne pathogen. Id. Unlike anthrax, the pathogen used was ingested rather than inhaled. 
Id.  
 114 See Anthrax: How People are Infected, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/anthrax/basics/how-people-are-infected.html (last updated Sept. 1, 2015). 
 115 See Amerithrax or Anthrax Investigation, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/ 
history/famous-cases/amerithrax-or-anthrax-investigation (last visited Oct. 7, 2016). 
 116 Culpepper, supra note 110. 
 117 Altman, supra note 99. 
 118 O’Toole et al., supra note 98, at 974. It is important to note that part of WHO’s preparedness program 
is “promoting the development of diagnostic tests for suspected cases of smallpox;” however, at present, no 
widely available diagnostic tests exist. Preparedness in the Event of a Smallpox Outbreak, supra note 106. 
 119 Altman, supra note 99. 
 120 Koplow, supra note 46, at 441. 
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C. International Agreements Addressing Bioterrorism 
The threat of bioterrorism is hardly new. The international community has 
grappled with this issue since the early twentieth century121 and, as a result, 
produced two notable treaties: the Geneva Protocol and the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). The first treaty, the Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases, and 
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, is more commonly referred to as the 
Geneva Protocol.122 The Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of chemical 
and biological weapons in war,123 was the international community’s first 
attempt to limit biological weapons. 
While undoubtedly a groundbreaking agreement, the Geneva Protocol’s 
inadequacies are glaring. For instance, in banning the use of biological 
weapons only in warfare,124 the Geneva Protocol failed to ban the use of 
biological weapons in other instances, such as terrorist attacks. Furthermore, 
“the treaty was silent on the production, storage, or transfer of chemical and 
biological weapons”125 and permitted countries to reserve the right to use 
biological or chemical warfare in retaliation.126 Because of these deficiencies 
and a lack of “mechanisms for verifying or compelling parties’ compliance,”127 
the Geneva Protocol was unable to effectively regulate the growing threat of 
bioterrorism. 
To remedy the shortcomings of the Geneva Protocol, the second treaty, the 
Biological Weapons Convention, was born.128 The goal of the BWC was to 
“prohibit[] the development, production, acquisition, transfer, retention, 
stockpiling, and use of biological and toxin weapons.”129 The treaty mandates 
that review conferences be held every five years in order to address new and 
 
 121 R. WILLIAM JOHNSTONE, BIOTERROR: ANTHRAX, INFLUENZA, AND THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
SECURITY 24–25 (2008). 
 122 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol]. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Koplow, supra note 46, at 453. 
 125 Culpepper, supra note 110, at 252. 
 126 Koplow, supra note 46, at 453. 
 127 Id. at 454. 
 128 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 
(entered into force Mar. 10, 1975) [hereinafter the BWC]. 
 129 The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/bw/ 
c48737.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2016). 
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changing biological threats.130 The BWC is particularly significant because it 
was “the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the production and use 
of an entire category of weapons.”131 The treaty entered into force in 1975 and 
as of April 2013, it had 170 parties and twelve signatory states.132 
Although the BWC rectified some of the issues found within the Geneva 
Protocol, it is still a flawed document that has failed to effectually address 
bioterrorism. For instance, the BWC “does not have an internationally 
supported approach to preventing bioterrorism proliferation;”133 thus, it is not 
universally applied. As with the SEP, international cooperation is crucial to the 
success of the BWC and yet many countries are not members.134 The activities 
of some non-member states, such as Egypt, Israel, and Syria, should give the 
international community pause.135 From Egypt’s political unrest136 to Israel’s 
relentless conflict with Palestine137 and Syria’s “long-standing biological-
warfare program,”138 the international community should fear the possibility 
that these non-member states could resort to using biological weapons to quell 
discord or to ignite conflict. However, even if every country were a member of 
the BWC, the treaty only regulates the behavior of sovereign states, meaning 
that bioterrorism by non-state actors, like ISIS, remains unregulated.139 Non-
state actors have engaged in deadly biological and chemical attacks since the 
 
 130 Id. 
 131 About the BWC, U.N. OFF. AT GENEVA, http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/ 
(httpPages)/77CF2516DDC5DCF5C1257E520032EF67?OpenDocument. 
 132 The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 129. A signatory state “refers to a state that 
is in political support of the treaty and willing to continue its engagement with the treaty process” but has not 
ratified or implemented said treaty. Renee Dopplick, Legal Obligations of Signatories and Parties to Treaties, 
INSIDE JUSTICE (Mar. 17, 2010), http://www.insidejustice.com/intl/2010/03/17/signatory_party_treaty/. 
Although not legally bound to the terms of the treaty, signatory states are prohibited from doing anything that 
would “‘defeat the object and purpose’ of the treaty.” Id. 
 133 Culpepper, supra note 110, at 252. 
 134 Id. at 252–53. 
 135 Id. at 253. 
 136 See generally Egypt Protests: At Least 14 Dead in Unrest As Country Marks Fourth Anniversary of 
Uprising, ABC (Jan. 25, 2015, 3:20 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-01-26/people-killed-in-unrest-on-
egypt-uprising-anniversary/6045594. 
 137 See generally Phil Black et al., Israeli Palestinian Conflict: Two Viewpoints; One Tragic Outcome, 
CNN (Oct. 21, 2015, 9:11 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/21/middleeast/israeli-palestinian-root-of-
violence/. 
 138 See generally Jill Bellamy van Aalst & Olivier Guitta, Syria’s Real Threat: Biological Weapons, 
NAT’L INTEREST (Sept. 19, 2013), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/syrias-real-threat-biological-
weapons-9093. 
 139 Koplow, supra note 46, at 493. 
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BWC’s inception140 and there continues to be little in place to prevent them 
from doing so again. 
Furthermore, the BWC lacks the verification and enforcement mechanisms 
necessary to achieve its objectives.141 As a result, the treaty has already been 
violated and those violations went undetected for inconceivably long periods 
of time.142 Even if these mechanisms were in place, the language of the treaty 
itself is problematic. The BWC specifies that a country can retain tools or 
continue activities commonly associated with developing biological weapons if 
they are “for a prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purpose.”143 Because 
“[m]any biological activities, technology, and equipment can be used for 
beneficial purposes,” it is difficult to distinguish whether a country’s objectives 
are for nefarious or peaceful purposes.144 With issues regarding verification, 
enforcement, and the textual language of the treaty itself, one might assume 
that these issues would be resolved at one of the BWC’s mandated review 
conferences. Unfortunately, there have been many attempts to revise the BWC, 
but negotiations have proven futile and the treaty remains flawed.145 
The aforementioned preparedness programs and treaties are just a few of 
the myriad ways146 that the international community has responded to the 
threat of bioterrorism. However, their blatant shortcomings will fail to provide 
the necessary security that a deliberate outbreak of the smallpox virus, or any 
other biological weapon, demands. These shortcomings suggest that, as a 
whole, the world is unprepared for a widespread biological attack. At present, 
there are no tools in international law that effectively ensure the enforcement 
of biological weapon norms, and bioterrorism is too dangerous to let violations 
go undetected and without consequence. With the potential for bioterrorism 
perpetually looming, changes must be made to destroy the last remaining 
 
 140 See generally Holly Fletcher, Aum Shinrikyo, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 19, 2012), 
http://www.cfr.org/japan/aum-shinrikyo/p9238#p2. In 1995, the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, released sarin, 
a deadly nerve gas, onto subway trains. Id. As a result, twelve people died and six thousand sought medical 
treatment. Id. 
 141 Koplow, supra note 46, at 457. 
 142 Culpepper, supra note 110, at 252; PRESTON, supra note 26. 
 143 BWC, supra note 128, art. I. 
 144 Culpepper, supra note 110, at 253. 
 145 Koplow, supra note 46, at 461. Following the 2001 anthrax attacks, some wondered if this bioterror 
attack would resurrect the BWC; however, the BWC was not invoked at all. See Fidler, supra note 34, at 14. 
 146 Other examples include the State Department’s Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction as well as the 
Biosecurity Engagement Program. See Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/offices/c55411.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2016); Culpepper, supra note 110, at 254. 
THOMPSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 12/21/2016 1:45 PM 
2016] AIRBORNE ASSASSIN 183 
smallpox vials once and for all and to protect against current and future 
biological threats. 
III. NECESSARY CHANGES TO ADDRESS BIOTERRORISM 
A. Bilateral Treaty with Russia to Destroy Official Stockpiles 
The first step that should be taken to combat bioterrorism is for the United 
States and Russia to formally destroy their official stockpiles of the smallpox 
virus held at the CDC and Vector, respectively. To accomplish this objective, 
the United States and Russia must enter into a bilateral treaty in which each 
country pledges to destroy its personal stocks. 
The Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on 
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms, also known as the New START Treaty,147 provides a useful framework 
and starting point to determine the structure and terms of the proposed treaty. 
The New START Treaty, which entered into force on February 5, 2011, 
focuses on reducing nuclear weapons and launchers deployed by the United 
States and Russia.148 This treaty is particularly helpful because it emphasizes 
verification and transparency,149 principles that are crucial to successfully 
eliminate smallpox stockpiles. In terms of verification, the treaty calls for “on-
site inspections150 and exhibitions, data exchanges, and notifications related to 
strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty.”151 The New 
START Treaty also mandates a specific timeline: the United States and Russia 
must meet the Treaty’s central limits within seven years of its date of 
enforcement.152 Most notably, the Treaty provides each country with “the 
flexibility to determine for itself the structure of its strategic forces within the 
aggregate limits of the Treaty.”153 These limits are not established subjectively, 
but rather through “rigorous analysis conducted by Department of Defense 
planners.”154 
 
 147 See New Start, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/index.htm (last updated July 
28, 2016). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. The treaty calls for eighteen on-site inspections to be conducted each year. Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 New Start, supra note 147. 
 154 Id. 
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Although progressive, the New START Treaty has some perceived flaws 
that should be avoided when designing the proposed treaty to eliminate the 
smallpox stockpiles. The main concern stems from the monitoring and 
verification components of the treaty,155 which are of the utmost importance in 
bioterrorism prevention. For instance, some “have questioned whether the 
monitoring provisions in the new treaty are sufficient to provide the United 
States with enough information to either confirm Russian compliance with the 
treaty or to detect efforts to violate its terms.”156 It is most unsettling that 
“neither party can be absolutely certain that the other is in perfect compliance 
with all the limits and restrictions in the treaty” on account of “ambiguities in 
the treaty language and varying interpretations of the treaty requirements.”157 
Although the United States is confident in the New START Treaty,158 its 
imperfections must not be duplicated to ensure successful destruction of 
smallpox stockpiles. 
In crafting a bilateral treaty between the United States and Russia, treaties 
of past and present should provide guidance. Because of the chilling effect that 
reservations had upon the Geneva Protocol, neither Russia nor the United 
States should be permitted to add reservations to the treaty.159 Further, the 
language in the BWC permitting biological activities for beneficial purposes 
should not be included.160 In the BWC, this provision served as little more than 
a loophole because it proved too cumbersome to identify which biological 
activities were truly for beneficial, rather than malicious, purposes.161 Thus, to 
close this loophole, the language of the treaty must strictly prohibit all 
biological activities involving smallpox. Like the New START Treaty, the 
proposed treaty should focus on verification and transparency by implementing 
a verification regime that includes on-site inspections. To eliminate potential 
interpretation issues, the treaty’s terms must be in clear and unambiguous 
language. If a term remains ambiguous or open to interpretation, the United 
States and Russia must include a mutually agreed upon interpretation 
 
 155 AMY F. WOOLF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41219, THE NEW START TREATY: CENTRAL LIMITS AND 
KEY PROVISIONS 28 (2015). 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 29. 
 158 Id. 
 159 See Koplow, supra note 46, at 453. 
 160 See Culpepper, supra note 110, at 253 (discussing how President George H. W. Bush resisted efforts 
by states to impose legally binding verification efforts in the BWC). 
 161 Id. 
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declaration,162 which will put forth what that term means and how it is to be 
interpreted upon implementation. As in the New START Treaty, the proposed 
treaty must include a strict timeline for the destruction of the smallpox 
stockpiles. To ensure flexibility and fairness in the destruction process, the 
timeline and overall limits of the treaty must not be decided arbitrarily; such 
components should therefore be determined following a comprehensive 
analysis by Department of Defense planners. 
Implementing this treaty would substantially minimize the threat of a 
smallpox outbreak. Without one of the world’s deadliest viruses chilling in 
laboratory freezers, mishaps or lapses in protocol at the Collaborating 
Centres163 will no longer be able to trigger a smallpox outbreak. With the 
official homes of smallpox destroyed, so too is the opportunity for a rogue 
actor or state to acquire the virus. While there is the possibility that unofficial 
stockpiles of the virus exist, scientists have previously advocated for an 
international agreement, believing that a treaty would decrease the possibility 
of a deliberate release of the virus.164 In the event of an actual outbreak, the 
official stockpiles are not necessary to produce the smallpox vaccine;165 thus, 
they are merely ticking time bombs, sitting in flawed laboratories and waiting 
to fall into the wrong hands. 
Critics of a bilateral treaty between the United States and Russia will 
undoubtedly cite the long, tumultuous history between the two countries. 
Although the Cold War is over and the Iron Curtain has been lifted, relations 
between the United States and Russia have remained strained. President 
Obama has publicly criticized Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine as a violation 
of Ukrainian sovereignty166 and even included imposing sanctions to “counter 
Russian aggression” as a key part of his 2015 National Security Strategy.167 
 
 162 “An interpretative declaration is an instrument that is annexed to a treaty with the goal of interpreting 
or explaining the provisions of the latter.” Glossary, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ 
overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/page1_en.xml (last visited Oct. 7, 2016). 
 163 The CDC is not alone in its disconcerting mishaps. A Vector scientist pricked her finger with a needle 
that contained the Ebola virus and subsequently died. See Miller, supra note 61.  
 164 See Henderson, Deliberations Regarding the Destruction of Smallpox Virus, supra note 29. 
 165 The smallpox vaccine does not even contain any smallpox. See Questions and Answers About 
Smallpox Vaccine, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 13, 2009), http://emergency.cdc.gov/ 
agent/smallpox/faq/characteristics.asp. 
 166 Lucy Westcott, Obama at the U.N.: World Cannot Stand By as Russia Violates Ukraine’s Sovereignty, 
NEWSWEEK (Sept. 28, 2015, 12:44 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/obama-un-world-cannot-stand-russia-
violates-ukraines-sovereignty-377494. 
 167 National Security Strategy, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2016). 
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Recent efforts to reduce Russia’s smallpox stockpiles were “scaled back in 
response to political difficulties in dealing with the Russian government.”168 
With the advent of a new year, the prospect of improved United States-Russia 
relations seems grim. In Russia’s latest national security strategy, President 
Vladimir Putin designated activities by the United States and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as dangerous to Russia’s national 
security169 and accused the United States and its allies of “attempting to 
maintain their dominance in global affairs” through a “policy of [Russian] 
containment.”170 As of October 2016, the working relationship that the United 
States had with Russia in Syria has deteriorated.171 U.S. Secretary of State, 
John Kerry, has even accused Russia of committing war crimes in the war-torn 
region.172 
In spite of the discernible tumult between these two world powers, it is 
important to note that the United States and Russia173 have previously engaged 
in extensive bilateral negotiations on a similar subject matter when tensions 
were at their highest. In the midst of the Cold War, the United States and 
Russia engaged in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which 
produced two international agreements, SALT I and SALT II.174 SALT I and 
SALT II were put in place as a means of controlling deadly arms, such as anti-
ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.175 Despite a tempestuous relationship, 
these adversaries were able to come together, compromise, and create treaties 
with the greater good of humanity in mind. Although relations between the 
United States and Russia remained tense after negotiations, both countries 
complied with the terms of the treaties until they expired.176 
 
 168 Culpepper, supra note 110, at 254 (CTR was originally developed to reduce Soviet stockpiles but its 
efforts were scaled back on the account of the Russian government).  
 169 Olga Oliker, Unpacking Russia’s New National Security Strategy, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L 
STUDIES (Jan. 7, 2016), http://csis.org/publication/unpacking-russias-new-national-security-strategy. 
 170 Jack Farchy, Putin Names NATO Among Threats in New Russian Security Strategy, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 2, 
2016, 5:30 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6e8e787e-b15f-11e5-b147-e5e5bba42e51.html#axzz3wlfLaL 
g1. 
 171 See Syria Conflict: US Calls for Russia and Syria War Crimes Probe, BBC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37590014. 
 172 Id. 
 173 At the time of the SALT negotiations, Russia was the Soviet Union. See Office of the Historian, 
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT) I and II, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://history.state.gov/ 
milestones/1969-1976/salt (last visited Oct. 7, 2016). 
 174 See id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
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Ultimately, the SALT negotiations and the resulting international 
agreements illustrate that the United States and Russia can successfully 
collaborate in pursuit of important global issues.177 If these two countries were 
able to convene during the Cold War, when United States-Russia relations 
were at its most contentious point, then they should be able to do so once 
again. Also, the purpose of the SALT negotiations, controlling deadly 
weapons, would be nearly identical to the purpose of negotiations surrounding 
the destruction of smallpox.178 Smallpox can be transformed into a biological 
weapon and it has been before.179 Like a nuclear weapon or a ballistic missile, 
a biological attack using smallpox would result in the unparalleled destruction 
of an unprotected population. 
This principle of successful collaboration in the face of global issues 
emerged more recently as both the United States and Russia prioritized the 
elimination of ISIS. Some contend that recent terrorist attacks perpetrated by 
ISIS will “increase[] the chances of greater U.S.-Russian cooperation.”180 In 
his plan to defeat ISIS, President Putin emphasized collective action by 
proposing the creation of an international coalition and encouraging other 
countries to support Syria’s efforts against ISIS.181 The United States has 
shown a willingness to collaborate with Russia on this issue since it has begun 
including Russia in strategic talks and has relaxed its stance on ousting the 
Russian-supported President of Syria, Bashar al-Assad.182 Further illustrating 
collaboration, the United States and Russia proposed a “resolution before the 
U.N. Security Council that places sanctions on ISIS in the same way it 
previously did to al Qaeda.”183 The resolution, which was adopted 
unanimously, demonstrates “that both countries can—at least in theory—join 
together to fight ISIS, even as they are often on opposing sides.”184 In spite of 
sanctions against Russia, President Obama does not wish for a new Cold War; 
instead, he publicly advocated for a “strong Russia” that will “work with the 
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U.S. to strengthen international order as a whole.”185 Although tensions persist 
between the two countries,186 their increased cooperation and ability to join 
forces in the interest of addressing a global threat suggests that these world 
powers can collectively combat the threat of bioterrorism by implementing a 
bilateral treaty to finally eliminate their respective stockpiles. 
B. United Nations Security Council Resolution: Implementing a New Legal 
Framework 
While the destruction of the official stockpiles of the smallpox virus is 
undoubtedly a monumental step towards increased global security, a bilateral 
treaty between the United States and Russia would only address one potential 
biological weapon. Viruses can mutate,187 evolve, and be genetically 
engineered.188 Long-forgotten diseases can reemerge in modern society.189 
With smallpox removed from the equation, there is no telling what agent of 
biological warfare could emerge next. The Geneva Protocol and the BWC have 
failed to effectively address these issues; thus, the international community 
needs a new, flexible framework that can adapt to the rapidly evolving field of 
bioterrorism190 and combat each newly weaponized pathogen. 
The international body that is most adept to develop and implement such a 
framework is the U.N. Security Council. Per the U.N. Charter, the Security 
Council is responsible “for the maintenance of international peace and 
security” and can “impose sanctions or even authorize the use of force” to 
achieve this objective.191 The 193 countries that are U.N. Member States192 are 
obligated under the Charter to comply with the decisions put forth by the 
Security Council.193 Because the Security Council is tasked with “determining 
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the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression,”194 it is the ideal 
institution to address bioterrorism, which is an indisputable threat to 
international peace and security. To properly secure international peace and 
protect against biological warfare, the Security Council must put forth a 
binding resolution that compels all Member States to adopt and implement a 
four-point legal framework. Modeled after the SEP’s “framework of broad 
principles and expectations”195 with a strong consideration of the shortcomings 
that befell prior attempts to address bioterrorism, this Comment proposes the 
following framework. 
1. Recognition 
All members of the international community should refer any and all 
suspicious biological activities to the Security Council. From there, the 
Security Council should investigate and decide whether there is a credible 
threat. Once a biological threat has been identified, the Security Council should 
decide what course of action to take, specifically whether the biological agent 
at issue should be destroyed. Although the decision regarding what approach to 
take will lie with the Security Council, the international global health 
community should provide guidance. Because WHO is one of the most 
influential voices in that community, it should guide the Security Council 
through support, collaboration, and counsel. Because WHO’s involvement in 
the SEP was crucial to the eradication of smallpox,196 the organization should 
once again play an important role in the eradication of other biological agents. 
Before making a decision, the Security Council should consult with and 
consider the opinions of both the scientific and international communities.197 It 
should also analyze the biological agent’s scientific value in terms of future 
research and whether or not the agent is necessary for the creation of a vaccine. 
The Security Council should then vote until a quorum is achieved. If the 
Security Council agrees to destroy the agent, they shall set a strict deadline for 
enforcement. WHO’s deadline for destruction of the official smallpox samples 
was continuously deferred or ignored until no deadline remained;198 thus, the 
deadline set by the Security Council should be rigidly enforced. 
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2. Enforcement 
One of the most significant issues surrounding the Geneva Protocol and the 
BWC was the absence of any enforcement mechanism.199 To avoid repeating 
history’s mistakes, some scholars call for the creation of an apolitical 
institution with legal authority to serve as the necessary enforcement 
mechanism.200 Thus, the United Nations should develop an agency within the 
organization that will ensure the enforcement of the Security Council’s 
decisions. This agency should remain staunchly apolitical to safeguard its 
collaboration with states.201 Similar to the U.N.’s peacekeeping troops, this 
agency must have the proper authority and jurisdiction to interfere with the 
bioterrorism activities of sovereign states and non-state actors.202 
3. Verification 
When WHO asked all states to relinquish their smallpox stockpiles, some 
laboratories chose to independently destroy their stocks; however, it is 
unknown whether such destruction actually took place.203 WHO never 
attempted to verify that the stocks were destroyed, which led to speculation 
that some countries covertly retained unofficial samples of the virus.204 To 
rectify this issue, verification of compliance is essential. Before the end of the 
designated timetable for destruction, all U.N. Member States should self-report 
their compliance to the U.N. enforcement agency. If a state fails to meet the set 
deadline, the Security Council should impose sanctions until that state has 
completed its required task. Once a state has self-reported its destruction, the 
enforcing agency should conduct periodic, unannounced compliance checks. If 
a state is deemed noncompliant, the Security Council should be permitted to 
sanction the state, use force, or refer the state to international criminal 
prosecution.205 
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4. Collaboration 
Like the eradication of smallpox, stopping bioterrorism will require the full 
cooperation and collaboration of the international community.206 The 
framework should be universally applied,207 and in order to achieve universal 
application, the resolution should provide non-member states with incentives 
to become full-fledged Member States.208 Although WHO has no binding legal 
authority, the organization has successfully convinced all countries to 
participate in the SEP,209 and therefore should also encourage non-member 
states to join this effort. In terms of collaboration, all Member States should be 
required to report suspicious biological activities of other Member States and 
non-state actors. If credible, the enforcing agency would be responsible for 
independently investigating the potential biological threat. 
C. Criminalizing Bioterrorism in International Law 
A bilateral treaty between the United States and Russia and a U.N. Security 
Council resolution are pivotal steps towards addressing bioterrorism and 
protecting international peace and security. In a perfect world, both would be 
implemented and function successfully. However, coaxing two fervent 
adversaries, both with widely different views and objectives, to agree on and 
comply with a treaty may prove challenging.210 Further, the Security Council 
resolution’s four-point framework to combat bioterrorism may not be 
implemented at all if one of the Security Council’s five permanent members, 
such as China or Russia, vetoes the resolution.211 Regardless of whether the 
treaty and the Security Council resolution remain viable options, bioterrorism 
must still be addressed. Thus, it is imperative to expressly criminalize 
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bioterrorism and related activities under international law.212 This move will 
ultimately put those developing and seeking agents of biological warfare in 
zugzwang. 
At present, “unauthorized use, development, and possession of biological 
weapons”213 is not expressly considered a crime under international law.214 
States and terrorists who use biological warfare are indeed subject to some 
sanctions in the international arena.215 If a state or state-sponsored terrorist 
organization uses a biological agent against a civilian population, then this 
could constitute a war crime under international law,216 which is subject to 
prosecution in the International Criminal Court (ICC).217 If a terrorist uses a 
biological weapon, any state party to the U.N. Convention on the Suppression 
of Terrorist Bombings is entitled to prosecute that terrorist.218 Unfortunately, 
this Convention has not been universally adopted by all states.219 Further, the 
aforementioned sanctions against states and terrorists are not applicable until 
after a biological attack has been perpetrated.220 On a domestic level, some 
states have recognized this misstep and enacted legislation that forbids the 
weaponization of pathogens altogether; however, not all states have done so.221 
The unprotected population in an increasingly interconnected world should not 
be forced to wait for a biological attack in order to secure protection under 
international law. 
To combat bioterrorism before an attack, the development, proliferation, 
and use of biological weapons must be considered a crime against humanity. 
The Rome Statute of the ICC defines crimes against humanity as “acts when 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack,” such as murder, 
extermination, and “other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally 
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
 
 212 See Kellman, supra note 200. 
 213 Fidler, supra note 34, at 15. 
 214 See Kellman, supra note 200, at 730. 
 215 Fidler, supra note 34, at 15. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter 
Rome Statute]. 
 218 Id. 
 219 See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 106-6 (2002), 2149 U.N.T.S. 256.  
 220 See Kellman, supra note 200, at 732–33. 
 221 See id. at 731. 
THOMPSON GALLEYSPROOFS2 12/21/2016 1:45 PM 
2016] AIRBORNE ASSASSIN 193 
health.”222 Although not specifically listed as a crime against humanity, the 
objectives of the proliferation, development, and use of biological weapons fit 
neatly within the ICC’s definition. Under international law, crimes against 
humanity violate jus cogens.223 The term jus cogens, “encompasses the notion 
of peremptory norms in international law”224 and “refers to the legal status that 
certain international crimes reach.”225 Under Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, “a peremptory norm of general 
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted.”226 These principles are so salient to the international community 
that they cannot be circumvented and any treaty in conflict with jus cogens is 
automatically voided.227 The international peremptory norms under jus cogens 
are not absolute and some scholars insist that the drafters of the Vienna 
Convention anticipated the emergence of new norms.228 When the Vienna 
Convention was adopted in 1969,229 bioterrorism was not on the forefront of 
global consciousness. Now, with the advancement of biotechnology, the spread 
of terrorism, and the use of biological agents, bioterrorism is of a much greater 
concern. By enacting domestic legislation as well as U.N. conventions and by 
designating the use of biological weapons as a war crime, many in the 
international community can demonstrate their absolute denunciation of 
bioterrorism in accordance with Article 53.230 
The Rome Statute provides the ICC with the authority to prosecute crimes 
against humanity.231 Although the Rome Statute is not universally adopted,232 
the ICC’s territorial jurisdiction may reach beyond the confines of the treaty. 
For instance, “[m]ost commentators focus on the territorial basis of the ICC as 
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legitimizing its jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party states under 
Article 12 . . . .”233 In addition to territorial jurisdiction, the ICC can prosecute 
crimes against humanity under universal jurisdiction.234 Under international 
law, “[t]he principle of universal jurisdiction allows the national authorities of 
any state to investigate and prosecute people for serious international crimes 
even if they were committed in another country.”235 Similar to piracy, with 
universal jurisdiction, “any state that can apprehend bioterrorists or investigate 
their activities should be legally obligated to do so and should have legal 
authority to prosecute them.”236 While the ICC may exercise universal 
jurisdiction, its reach is limited.237 The ICC must have territorial jurisdiction, 
consent from the state in question,238 and “a legitimate interest on the basis of 
the universal nature of the crimes to prosecute the nationals of non-party 
states.”239 However, if the Security Council refers a non-party state or national 
to the ICC, the ICC can circumvent these requirements and exercise universal 
jurisdiction.240 Expressly criminalizing bioterrorism as a crime against 
humanity may not deter bioterrorists because “their activities are already 
illegal in most jurisdictions in which they operate.”241 Nevertheless, with the 
ability to prosecute both parties and non-parties of the Rome Statute under two 
jurisdictional principles, the ICC has the power to prevent serious harm by 
holding bioterrorists accountable before a biological attack occurs. 
CONCLUSION 
In a world of mass transit and constant interconnectedness, the 
reintroduction of the easily transmitted, deadly smallpox virus would prove 
devastatingly detrimental to the unprotected, unvaccinated human population. 
It is incomprehensible that the stockpiles have not been destroyed despite (1) 
the prospect of bioterrorism, (2) the scientific community’s support of 
destroying the virus, and (3) the fact that it holds little scientific value. Keeping 
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this virus in the Collaborating Centres is too great of a risk for humanity to 
incur. This risk can be mitigated through a bilateral treaty between the United 
States and Russia in which each country pledges to finally destroy their 
respective stocks of the virus. 
The destruction of the official stockpiles is merely one step in the ongoing 
fight against bioterrorism. As viruses mutate and evolve, the threat of 
bioterrorism remains constant; thus, it is imperative that the U.N. Security 
Council puts forth a resolution with a legal framework that is flexible enough 
to address current and future threats. Having learned from the mistakes of past 
efforts, this proposed four-point framework focuses on recognizing the 
biological threat, instituting a strict plan to address the threat, adopting an 
enforcement mechanism, verifying compliance, and ensuring international 
collaboration. With the goal of present and future global security, this 
framework can be adapted to meet each new and developing biological 
weapon. 
Lastly, the development, proliferation, and use of biological weapons must 
be categorized as a crime against humanity under international law. Including 
bioterrorism in the list of crimes against humanity is necessary to illustrate the 
gravity of biological attacks and it opens doors for greater accountability. This 
categorization allows the ICC to exercise a larger jurisdictional reach over 
bioterrorists regardless of where they operate. By expressly criminalizing 
bioterrorism activities, the world will no longer have to wait for a biological 
attack to occur in order to secure protection under international law. 
Working atop a flawed laboratory, Janet Parker could not have known that 
with each breath, her lungs filled with an airborne assassin. The doctors could 
not immediately identify a nearly eradicated disease, especially one that she 
had already been vaccinated for. After succumbing to the speckled monster, 
Janet Parker became a prime example of why the official smallpox stockpiles 
must be destroyed. Unfortunately, little has changed in the four decades 
following her death, as the virus that killed her sits patiently within the freezers 
of similarly flawed laboratories. Janet Parker was the last person to have died 
from smallpox and, to this day, she retains that title. Well, at least for now. 
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